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Abstract
We study internal incentives, transparency and firm performance in multidivisional orga-
nizations. Two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives, and decide
whether to publicly disclose their performances. In each division a risk-neutral principal deals
with a risk-averse (exclusive) agent under moral hazard. Each agent exerts an unverifiable effort
that creates a spillover on the effort cost of the other agent. We first study the determinants
of the optimal principal-agent contract with and without performance transparency. Then,
we show how effort spillovers affect the equilibrium communication behavior of each division.
Both principals commit to disclose the performance of their agents in equilibrium when efforts
are complements, while no communication is the only equilibrium outcome when efforts are
substitutes.
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1 Introduction
Many large firms are heavily decentralized and delegate important tasks to independent divisions,
whose objectives are not always aligned — see, e.g., Groves and Loeb (1979) and Wettstein (1994)
among others. Lining up divisions’ incentives often requires accurate information, whose costs may
depend on the strategic interaction between the divisions’ staff. For example, using information
about one division to improve the performance of another may be difficult when divisions compete
for the same budget, operate in the same or related markets, or one supplies the other with goods
or services.
This paper examines the link between incentives, transparency and performance in multidi-
visional firms. Knowledge sharing mechanisms are traditionally believed to enhance efficiency:
because they stimulate learning and imitation — see, e.g., Griffin and Hauser (1992) — or because,
by improving firms’ internal transparency, they enhance stakeholders’ ability to access capital mar-
kets — see, e.g., Milgrom (1981) and Roberts (1992). However, these mechanisms may also affect
firms’ organization and contractual choices. What is the effect of transparency on the trade-off be-
tween risk and incentives in multidivisional firms? What are the costs and benefits of information
sharing when divisions impose externalities one on the other?
To address these issues we study a firm composed of two independent divisions, each ruled by
a principal (top manager) dealing with an exclusive agent (mid-level manager or worker). Top
managers simultaneously and independently design incentive contracts for their workers and decide
whether or not to publicly disclose their division’s performance — i.e., they choose whether to
be transparent or not.1 Agents’ effort is unverifiable and produces cross-division spillovers (ex-
ternalities): an agent’s marginal cost of effort depends on the effort exerted by the other agent,
either negatively (complementary efforts) or positively (substitute efforts). Divisions are heteroge-
neous with respect to the volatility of their profits, and contracts can only be based on observed
performances, which are an imperfect measure of agents’ efforts and are correlated across divisions.
We start by analyzing how each principal conditions his own agent’s wage to the performance
of the other division (when he can do so), and study the determinants of equilibrium contracts
with and without communication (transparency). This allows us to highlight the specificity of our
contracting game relative to the benchmark in which there is only one principal-agent pair.
As expected, under secret contracts, incentives equal those of the benchmark when principals do
not communicate. Instead, principals enforce steeper own-performance bonuses when both choose
to be transparent. The wedge between incentives with and without multiple divisions widens as
divisions become more connected: the more correlated are their performances, the steeper the
incentives that principals offer in equilibrium.
The cross-performance bonus is determined by the need to diversify risk and its sign depends on
1A transparent division commits to publicly disclose its performance. This allows the principal of the other division
to condition the payment pledged to his own agent not only on his performance (own-performance bonus), but also on
the performance of the other agent (cross-performance bonus). The latter is, in fact, a form of relative performance
evaluation.
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the correlation between divisions’ performances. When the divisions’ performances are positively
correlated, each principal rewards his agent if the other division under-performs, because a bad
performance by the other division is a signal that his own agent may under-perform too. In this
case the cross-performance bonus is negative. By contrast, when the correlation between divisions’
performances is negative, each principal rewards his agent if the other division performs well to
optimally diversify risk. Hence, the cross-performance bonus is positive. As intuition suggests,
this bonus decreases in the volatility of the other division’s performance: if performance becomes
noisier, the value of information received by that division decreases.
Equilibrium efforts are unambiguously higher than in the case of a single principal-agent pair
if effort externalities are positive, while the comparison yields ambiguous predictions when efforts
are substitutes. In this case, two contrasting effects are at play. On the one hand, both principals
offer steeper incentives than in the benchmark, thus boosting the agents’ efforts. However, since
efforts are strategic substitutes, the increase of one agent’s effort implies a reduction of the other
agent’s effort. It turns out that the first effect dominates when the performance of the division
from which a principal receives information is sufficiently noisy — i.e., receiving information from
a transparent division mitigates moral hazard and enhances effort even if agents impose negative
externalities one on the other.
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the communication game. Principals first decide whether
to communicate or not, and then offer contracts to their agents. It turns out that, in equilibrium, the
communication behavior of each principal depends on the nature of effort spillovers. When efforts
are complements there is a unique equilibrium in which both divisions choose to be transparent,
while no communication is the unique equilibrium when efforts are substitutes. Even though
divisions are heterogeneous as to profits’ volatility, asymmetric equilibria in which only one principal
shares information do not exist.
Two main effects shape the incentives to share information in our setting. First, a principal’s
decision to share information generates an indirect strategic effect on his agent’s effort. Indeed, the
information disclosed to the other division is used to increase the effort of that division’s agent,
which indirectly affects the effort of the agent working for the principal who discloses his division’s
performance. Second, when a principal commits to disclose the performance of his division, he is
also directly affecting his own agent’s effort. This is because a principal’s disclosure decision affects
the effort of the agent working in the other division, which in turn determines the agency costs
that the principal has to pay to control his own agent. Hence, any change in the effort of the other
division modifies the fixed component of the wage that each principal pays to his own agent.
Taken together, these results offer novel predictions both on the type of vertical contracts that
shape the internal organization of multidivisional firms, and on the process of communication among
their independent profit centers. The model provides testable implications for: the determinants
of divisions’ incentives to share information; the link between the power of incentives and cross-
division externalities; the impact of monitoring and contractual power on their internal structure;
the limits to decentralization.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the received literature.
Section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 characterizes the agents’ effort choices and discusses some
important features of the equilibrium contracts. Section 5 presents the equilibrium contracts in
the subgames following the first-stage transparency decisions. In Section 6, we characterize the
equilibrium disclosure choices. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Our findings contribute to the literature on multidivisional firms. Stemming from Hirshleifer (1957),
this literature has examined the resource allocation problem of the headquarter of a divisionalized
firm, whose objective is to harmonize incentives among different, and possibly competing, divi-
sions. An efficient allocation of resources is achieved either directly, through a centralized design
of incentives — see, e.g., Faul´ı-Oller and Giralt (1995) and Groves and Loeb (1979) among others
— or, indirectly, through transfer prices between units — see, e.g., Baldenius and Reichelstein
(2006) and Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982). In our model, units’ contracting decisions are fully
decentralized — i.e., they cannot be set by the headquarter. This seems reasonable when contracts
can be secretly renegotiated.
Another strand of related literature examines firms’ optimal organization form as a response
to information asymmetries within firms — see, e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1995), Berkovitch, Israel,
and Spiegel (2010), Besanko, Re´gibeau, and Rockett (2005), Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000), Qian,
Roland, and Xu (2006) and Rotemberg (1999) among many others. All these papers develop
theories in which firms’ organizational structure is endogenous, and is determined by the trade-offs
between the costs and the benefits of divisionalization. In our model the firm structure is exogenous:
our objective is to analyze the potential conflicts between units and determine how asymmetries
between them determine their decisions on contracts and transparency.
In this respect, our model is closer in spirit to the growing literature linking the issue of optimal
contract design to that of communication between principals. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) devise a
sequential game in which principals dealing with the same (privately informed) agent learn through
costly contracting and then share with the rival the elicited information. More recently, Piccolo
and Pagnozzi (2013) have extended this idea to the case of vertical hierarchies. In these models,
players acquire private information by contracting with common parties, and create new private
information by taking decisions that affect both rivals and contractual counterparts. The approach
taken in this literature is different from the one employed in oligopoly models — e.g., Novshek
and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985) — where the information
shared by competitors is exogenous. In these models there are no incentive issues within firms and
communication may simply help to overcome coordination problems, thereby facilitating implicit
collusion.2
2The standard industrial organization approach to information sharing has been applied in the management
literature studying information sharing within supply chains. In these models a manufacturer deals with competing
retailers and the information sharing decision depends on the contract type and the form of competition (see, e.g., Ha
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On the moral hazard side, Maier and Ottaviani (2009) study the costs and benefits of trans-
parency in a common agency game in which principals commit to share information about the
common agent’s performance. We study the case of exclusive deals. In contrast to Maier and Ot-
taviani (2009), we find that with exclusive deals the type of externalities that divisions impose one
on the other is crucial to determine the equilibrium degree of transparency. This difference arises
because in our model the agents’ efforts are imperfect complements and can even be substitutes,
while in their framework the effort of the common agent affects the profits of both principals. In
a nutshell, while in Maier and Ottaviani (2009) the main issue is free-riding — i.e., each principal
would like the other to pay for the agent’s effort — in our model this problem disappears when
efforts are substitutes.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature on relative performance evaluation. The
possibility of linking an agent’s compensation to the performance of another agent de facto allows
principals to enforce relative performance evaluations. While the existing literature has mainly
focused on the problem of a single principal dealing with several agents that free-ride one on the
other — see, e.g., (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, Ch. 8) — in our context information sharing
provides a natural tool to enforce the relative performance evaluation of agents that serve principals
with (possibly) conflicting objectives. To the best of our knowledge, only Bertoletti and Poletti
(1996) analyze a similar idea in a context with adverse selection and risk neutral agents. Lottery
contracts in their setting allow to implement the first-best outcome.
3 The model
Players and environment. Consider a firm consisting of two independent divisions (departments or
profit centers). Division i (i = 1, 2) is modeled as a principal-agent pair, composed by a principal
(manager) Pi, and an exclusive agent (mid-level manager, or employee) Ai. Each division carries
over a project that yields a gross profit yi, which is linear in Ai’s unverifiable effort, ai, and in an
additive random component, εi. That is,
yi = ai + εi, (1)
where εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
i ) for every i. We allow ε1 and ε2 to be correlated, with Cov(ε1, ε2) = ρσ1σ2.
The parameter ρ ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the correlation index between the divisions’ (gross) profits y1
and y2.
Preferences. Principals are risk neutral and offer contracts (wages) to their exclusive agents. Pi
maximizes his expected (gross) profit net of the wage paid to Ai. Thus, Pi’s objective function is
E[yi − wi (·) ], (2)
and Tong (2008); Li and Zhang (2008), among many others). We contribute to this literature by studying the impact
of divisions internal incentives on cross-divisions communication strategies. In a sense, our approach innovates upon
this literature by opening the black-box of divisions.
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where wi (·) denotes Ai’s wage, whose structure depends on the transparency choice of each division
and will be introduced shortly.
Agents are risk-averse with CARA preferences and additively separable effort cost — i.e., Ai’s
certainty utility is
ui(wi, ai, aj) = 1− e
−r(wi−ψi(ai,aj)).
The function ψi (ai, aj) measures Ai’s cost of exerting effort ai, which depends also on Aj ’s effort.
The parameter r > 0 indicates the absolute risk-aversion index, which (for simplicity) is common
to both agents. Following Faul´ı-Oller and Giralt (1995) and Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (2010),
we assume that
ψi (ai, aj) =
a2i
2
− δaiaj .
This specification for the effort cost includes a standard quadratic component (a2i /2) and an in-
teraction term (δaiaj), which reflects potential externalities that agents may exert on each other.
The parameter δ ∈ (−1, 1) is key to our analysis: it measures the type of (strategic) interaction
between agents’ efforts.3 Agents’ efforts are strategic substitute when δ < 0, as they create negative
spillovers across business units — e.g., when these units compete for the same budget, or when
they operate on the same or related markets. When δ > 0, instead, agents’ efforts are strategic
complements. This case captures, for example, the positive externalities generated by investments
in basic R&D and informative advertising campaigns that benefit not only the unit enacting them,
but also the other units of an organization. Alternatively, positive spillovers may emerge when
business units jointly invest in essential facilities, such as distributional networks, that allow them
to market their products more effectively and reduce operating costs.
Communication, contracts and timing. A transparent division discloses its performance to the
other division. Principals choose their disclosure rule (all or nothing) independently. Further, we
assume that this choice is publicly observable and there is full commitment to it. This gives rise
to three scenarios: one in which both principals choose to be transparent (full communication),
one in which none does (no communication), and one in which only one does (partial or one-sided
communication).
The timing of the game is as follows:
• (T = 0) Principals decide whether to disclose their agents’ performance.
• (T = 1) The chosen transparency regime is observed by all players. Principals offer contracts.
• (T = 2) Agents choose efforts, the projects’ returns realize and principals disclose information
(if they committed to do so). Payments are made.
3Note that this interaction is on the intensive margin only. We rule out externalities on the extensive margin
which play no role under secret contracts.
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Contracts are secret and, hence, have no strategic value.4 We restrict the analysis to the class
of linear contracts — i.e., each principal offers a wage
wi(yi, yj) = αi + βiyi + Ijγiyj ∀i, j = 1, 2, (3)
where the indicator function Ij ∈ {0, 1} takes value 1 if Pj adopts a transparent regime and shares
with Pi the information regarding Aj ’s performance, and equals 0 otherwise. Hence, αi is the
fixed wage component, βi measures the responsiveness of Ai’s pay to his own performance (the
standard bonus in this literature), while γi measures how Ai’s wage reacts to Aj ’s performance
(the cross-performance component of the wage).
The reason why we focus on linear contracts is twofold. First, this restriction is standard in
the CARA-normal setting — see, e.g., (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, Ch. 5). This approach
hinges on Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which shows that linear contracts are optimal in a
dynamic CARA-normal model if effort is chosen in continuous time by the agent and (at each
stage) the principal rewards him based on the overall history of past performances.5 The same
type of argument justifies the use of linear contracts in our setting, because secret contracts imply
that managerial compensations have no strategic value. Second, we consider linear contracts to
compare our results with those of Maier and Ottaviani (2009), who impose the same restriction in
a setting with common agency.
The possibility of conditioning the wage of one agent on the performance of the other de facto
introduces a simple form of relative performance evaluation. To avoid the possibility that agents
(collectively) undo the effect of these contracts we rule out side transfers across divisions. Each
player’s outside option is normalized to zero.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Since con-
tracts are private, we have to make an assumption on each agent’s off-equilibrium beliefs about
behavior in the other division. Following most of the literature on private contracts (e.g., Caillaud,
Jullien, and Picard (1995) and Martimort (1996)), we assume that agents have passive beliefs: re-
gardless of the contract offered by his principal, an agent always believes that the other principal
offers the equilibrium contract and the other agent exerts the equilibrium effort. This assumption
captures the idea that, since principals are independent and act simultaneously, a principal cannot
signal to his agent information that he does not possess about the other principal’s contract — i.e.,
the no signal what you do not know requirement introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
We solve the model under two natural assumptions that must hold in every possible scenario.
The first prescribes that an agent is willing to exert positive effort at equilibrium — i.e., ai > 0. The
4The commitment value of observable contracts has been extensively analyzed in the traditional industrial organi-
zation literature. We will abstract from this issue by assuming secrecy, which is natural when public contracts can be
secretly renegotiated, or when division principals can overturn the contractual rules chosen by the firm’s headquarter
— see, e.g., Katz (1991).
5Although standard in the applied contract theory literature, it must be noted that the restriction to linear
contracts is not without loss of generality. Mirrlees (1999) argues that (already in a single principal-agent model)
discontinuous contracts are nearly first-best.
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second is that an agent’s effort cost and its derivative cannot be negative — i.e., ψi (ai, aj) ≥ 0 and
∂
∂ai
ψi (ai, aj) ≥ 0 for every admissible pair (ai, aj). The latter, in turn, implies that the marginal
cost of effort is positive. In the Appendix we provide a formal statement of these assumptions.
The single principal-agent pair benchmark. Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, recall that
without cross-division spillovers (δ = 0), the agent’s effort choice satisfies the first-order condition
ai = βi, and the optimal contract entails
β∗i = a
∗
i =
1
1 + rσ2i
.
Hence, both a higher volatility (σ2i ) and a higher risk aversion index (r) induce Pi to offer a low-
powered incentive scheme. This is because more uncertainty makes the realized profit yi a worse
indicator of Ai’s effort and greater risk-aversion commands a larger risk-premium for the agent
— see, e.g., (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, Ch. 4) and (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, Ch. 4).
Throughout the paper we study how the introduction of the correlation term ρ and the effort
interaction parameter δ shapes equilibrium contracts and transparency.
4 Contract design: preliminary insights
In this section we characterize how the contract offered by one principal is affected by the choice on
transparency made by the other principal. To this purpose, we first study the effort game between
agents and then turn to analyze the principals’ contract choices.
Optimal effort. Suppose that Aj chooses effort aj in equilibrium. Using the wage function in (3)
together with the performance structure in (1) yields
wi (yi, yj) = αi + βi(ai + εi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yi
+ Ijγi(aj + εj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yj
. (4)
Hence, agent Ai’s certainty equivalent is
6
CEi (ai, aj) ≡ αi + βiai + Ijγiaj −
r
2
[σ2i β
2
i + Ij(σ
2
jγ
2
i + 2βiγiσiσjρ)]−
a2i
2
+ δaiaj . (5)
6Due to the noise in the performance measures, agents receive an uncertain wage for any pair of efforts they
choose. When this noise is normally distributed and the gents’ utility has the CARA form, it is convenient to carry
out the analysis in terms of the certainty equivalent each agent obtains upon choosing a given level of effort, holding
fixed the effort of the other agent. By definition, the certainty equivalent is the certain payment that gives an agent
the same expected utility obtained with the original gamble:
1− e−rCEi(·) = 1− E
[
e
−r
[
αi+βiai+Ijγiaj+βiεi+Ijγiεj−
a2
i
2
+δaiaj
]]
.
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It follows that the effort level that maximizes Ai’s expected utility is
ai (aj) ≡ βi + δaj , (6)
which defines Ai’s best reaction to Aj ’s effort. This function depends in a direct way only on the
sensitivity of Ai’s wage to own performance yi — i.e., βi — but not on the cross-performance bonus
γi: in fact, Pj ’s decision on the transparency regime has no direct impact on Ai’s optimal effort.
This is because the performance of each agent depends exclusively on his own effort and not on
that of the other agent.7 Nevertheless, Ai’s reaction function depends on Aj ’s effort, so the choice
of Pj on the transparency regime indirectly affects Ai’s effort insofar as it affects Aj ’s effort, as will
be explained shortly.
Using the expressions in (6), it is then easy to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Regardless of the transparency regime, if principals are expected to offer βi and βj in
equilibrium, the agents’ equilibrium effort choices are
ai
(
βi, βj
)
≡
βi + δβj
1− δ2
∀i, j = 1, 2, (7)
with
∂ai(βi,βj)
∂βi
> 0, and
∂ai(βi,βj)
∂βj
≥ 0 if, and only if, δ ≥ 0.
The positive sign of the impact of βi on ai is intuitive. Moreover, note that the impact of βj
on ai depends on the sign of δ. A higher value of βj induces Ai to work more if efforts generate
positive spillovers (δ > 0): with complementarity, a higher effort by Aj reduces Ai’s marginal cost
of effort. Hence, an increase in βj raises aj and translates into a higher effort’s value by agent Ai.
The opposite holds true when efforts are substitutes and generate negative spillovers (δ < 0).
Optimal (linear) contracts. Suppose that Aj is expected to exert effort aj in equilibrium. Regardless
of the first-stage Pi’s decision on transparency, Ai’s (ex ante) participation constraint binds in
equilibrium — i.e., (5) is equal to zero — so that
αi + βiai(aj) + Ijγiaj ≡
r
2
[σ2i β
2
i + Ij(σ
2
jγ
2
i + 2βiγiσiσjρ)] +
ai(aj)
2
2
− δai(aj)aj . (8)
Using the linear performance in (1) together with the wage structure in (4), Pi’s objective function
is
E[ai (aj) + εi − (αi + βiai (aj) + Ijγiaj + βiεi + Ijγiεj) ] = ai (aj)− [αi + βiai(aj) + Ijγiaj ] .
7See a previous version of the paper for a model in which each agent’s effort affects not only his own performance,
but also the other agent’s performance.
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Hence, (8) implies that Pi’s maximization problem writes as
max
(βi,γi)
{
ai (aj)−
r
2
[
σ2i β
2
i + Ij(σ
2
jγ
2
i + 2βiγiσiσjρ)
]
−
ai (aj)
2
2
+ δai (aj) aj
}
, (9)
where ai(aj) is given by (6).
The first-order conditions with respect to βi and γi are, respectively
∂ai (aj)
∂βi
= r
[
σ2i βi + Ijγiσiσjρ
]
+
∂ai (aj)
∂βi
[ai (aj)− δaj ] , (10)
−rIj(σ
2
jγi + βiσiσjρ) = 0, (11)
where
∂ai(aj)
∂βi
= 1 by equation (6). Indeed, because contracts are secret, any (out of equilibrium)
change in βi affects Ai’s effort only through its direct effect on (6) — i.e., holding Aj ’s effort fixed
at the (conjectured) equilibrium level.
These first-order conditions highlight how the basic trade-off between risk and incentives changes
in a multidivisional firm in which, due to transparency, the principal of each division may tailor his
agent’s compensation to the performance of the agents working for other divisions. The first-order
condition with respect to βi in equation (10) has a simple interpretation. Its left-hand side is
standard and represents the marginal benefit associated with an increase in the own performance
bonus. The two terms on the right-hand side capture the impact of a higher bonus on Ai’s risk
premium and effort cost. First, a higher bonus βi makes Ai more responsive to his own performance.
Hence, it increases the agent’s risk exposure and calls for higher insurance: a standard cost of
providing high-powered incentives. Other things being equal, this extra cost depends not only on
Ai’s risk aversion (r) and the volatility of division-i’s profit (σi), but also on whether principal Pj
commits to disclose information. If he does, agent Ai’s insurance will also depend on the sensitivity
of his wage to Aj ’s performance (γi), the correlation index (ρ) and the volatility of division-j’s
profit (σj). The second term on the right-hand side of (10) shows that, by increasing agent Ai’s
effort, a higher own-performance bonus makes it more costly for the agent to exert effort. Also, it
illustrates the effect of the interaction term δaj on Pi’s optimal contract. When δ is negative, so
that efforts are strategic substitutes, principal Pi is less willing to offer a high-powered incentive
if agent Aj is expected to exert high effort in equilibrium. The opposite holds when efforts are
complements (δ > 0).
The first-order condition with respect to γi in (11) represents the main novelty of introducing
the choice on transparency in a setting with multiple divisions. Clearly, this condition matters only
if Pj discloses Aj ’s performance to Pi — i.e., if Ij = 1. Two effects determine the cross-performance
bonus γi. First, by making Ai’s compensation more responsive to Aj ’s performance, Pi induces Ai
to take a higher risk, for which he needs to be compensated. Second, there is a risk-diversification
effect: when Ai’s wage is tailored to his opponent’s performance, increasing γi spurs Pi’s expected
profits as long as the agents’ performances are negatively correlated (ρ < 0), whereas it decreases
Pi’s expected profits if the agents’ performances are positively correlated (ρ > 0). The strength
10
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of this risk-diversification effect clearly depends on the magnitude of the own-performance bonus
βi.
8 If βi is equal to zero then there is no need for risk-diversification because Ai’s wage does not
depend on Aj ’s performance. By contrast, when βi is positive, Ai’s wage positively depends on his
own performance. Hence, to diversify Ai’s risk exposure, Pi chooses a positive cross-performance
bonus γi when ε1 and ε2 are negatively correlated, and a negative one when they are positively
correlated.
5 Equilibrium analysis
We now characterize the equilibrium efforts and contracts chosen in every subgame following the
principals’ (first-stage) communication decisions.
5.1 No communication
Consider the subgame in which none of the divisions commits to disclose its performance — i.e.,
Ii = Ij = 0 — and let α
n
i + β
n
i yi be the wage offered by Pi.
Proposition 1 In the regime without communication
βni ≡
1
1 + rσ2i
= β∗i ∀i = 1, 2.
At equilibrium, agent Ai exerts effort
ani ≡
1 + rσ2j + δ(1 + rσ
2
i )(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ2i
)
(1 + rσ2j )
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2.
Moreover, ani ≥ a
n
j if, and only if, σ
2
i ≤ σ
2
j , a
n
i decreases with σ
2
i , and it increases with σ
2
j if, and
only if, δ < 0.
Because we assumed unobservable contracts and passive beliefs, principals offer the same bonus
as in the standard principal-agent problem (which obtains when δ = 0) — i.e. βni = β
∗
i . This is
because the effort of agent Ai reacts to a change in its own bonus βi only via its direct impact on
ai — see equation (6).
Finally, using the equilibrium condition (7) and the expression for the equilibrium bonus βni ,
we compare the agents’ efforts to that exerted in the single principal-agent model.
Corollary 1 If there are positive effort spillovers, δ ≥ 0, then ani ≥ a
∗
i . By contrast, if there are
negative spillovers, δ < 0, then ani ≥ a
∗
i if σ
2
j is large enough.
Both agents exert more effort than in the single principal-agent model when spillovers are
positive. That is, ani > a
∗
i when δ > 0, with a
n
i = a
∗
i if δ = 0. The reason is that principals
8For the sake of exposition, we assume here that βi is positive. We later verify that in equilibrium βi > 0.
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can exploit the synergies between their agents to implement higher efforts at lower costs. When,
instead, efforts are substitutes the result is non-obvious because of the strategic effect linking the
agents’ effort choices. The result shows that, in the regime without communication, ani exceeds
a∗i when σ
2
j is large enough. This is because, since Aj ’s effort is decreasing in σ
2
j , as σ
2
j increases
the division-j’s monitoring power weakens and the externality that Aj imposes on Pi becomes
negligible.
5.2 Full transparency
Consider the subgame in which both divisions disclose their performance — i.e., Ii = Ij = 1 — and
let αti + β
t
iyi + γ
t
iyj be Pi’s wage offer.
Proposition 2 Assume that both principals choose to be transparent, then
βti ≡
1
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
∀i = 1, 2, (12)
γti ≡ −
σi
σj
ρ
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
∀i, j = 1, 2. (13)
Hence, βti ≥ β
n
i = β
∗
i and γ
t
i ≥ 0 if, and only if, ρ ≤ 0. Moreover,
ati ≡
1 + δ + r(1− ρ2)(σ2j + δσ
2
i )
(1− δ2)(1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2))(1 + rσ2j (1− ρ
2))
≥ 0 ∀i, j = 1, 2,
with ati ≥ a
t
j if, and only if, σj ≥ σi. Effort a
t
i decreases with σ
2
i , while it increases with σ
2
j if, and
only if, δ < 0.
As for the case without communication (Proposition 1), and for the same reasons discussed
above, the equilibrium contracts offered by Pi and Pj do not depend on the interaction parameter δ.
However, the equilibrium contracts under full transparency differ from those obtained in the no
communication regime along two fundamental dimensions. First, since the divisions’ performances
are correlated, with full transparency principals can optimally diversify the risk taken by their
agents, thereby reducing agency costs and implementing steeper incentive schemes — i.e., βti ≥
βni = β
∗
i . Moreover, one can easily verify that
∂βti
∂ρ
=
2rρσ2i(
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
)2 ≥ 0 ⇔ ρ ≥ 0.
A U-shaped relationship arises between the own-performance coefficient βti and the correlation
index ρ: when the divisions’ performances are strongly correlated (either positively or negatively)
principals exploit more heavily risk-diversification to reduce agency costs. This, in turn, allows
them to provide steeper incentives.
Equation (13) establishes the link between Ai’s equilibrium wage and Aj ’s performance. The
sign of this coefficient depends on the correlation index ρ and again hinges on the risk-diversification
12
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logic discussed above. When performances are positively correlated (ρ > 0) a bad performance
by Aj likely causes Ai to underperform. Hence, principal Pi rewards his agent when division j
underperforms (yj < 0). Thus, γ
t
i < 0 in this case. By the same token, when performances are
negatively correlated (ρ < 0) risk-diversification induces Pi to reward Ai when the other division
performs well — i.e., γti > 0. Finally, notice that γ
t
i is decreasing in σ
2
j : receiving information from
a division whose performance is noisy has little value. As a consequence, the incentive scheme is
optimally less responsive to such information.
Differentiating with respect to ρ and σi, one can also verify that
∂γti
∂ρ
= −
σi
σj
1 + σ2i r
(
1 + ρ2
)
(
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
)2 < 0, (14)
∂γti
∂σi
= −
ρ
(
1− rσ2i
(
1− ρ2
))
σj
(
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
)2 ≥ 0 ⇔ −ρ
[
2−
1
βti
]
≥ 0.
The derivative in (14) measures the impact of the correlation index ρ on the cross-performance
bonus γti. As ρ grows larger in absolute value, the divisions’ profits become more correlated. Thus,
to diversify risk, principal Pi responds with a reduction of the (absolute) value of γ
t
i if performances
are positively correlated, and with an increase in γti otherwise.
The impact of σi on γ
t
i is shaped by two contrasting effects. First, holding βi fixed, a larger σi
implies more need for risk-diversification because agent Ai takes more risk. Hence, γi must increase
in absolute value: a direct risk-diversification effect. Second, a larger σi implies a lower βi because
division-i’s performance is noisier. his induces a lower γi because agent Ai takes less risk: an
indirect risk-shifting effect. The tension between these two effects depends on the sign of ρ and
the magnitude of the own-performance bonus βti. Assume first that ρ > 0, so that γ
t
i < 0. Then, a
larger σi tends to increase γ
t
i in absolute value when β
t
i <
1
2 , because the direct risk-diversification
effect dominates the indirect risk-shifting effect. Next, assume ρ < 0, so that γti > 0. In this case, a
larger σi tends to increase γ
t
i when β
t
i <
1
2 , because the direct risk-diversification effect dominates
the indirect risk-shifting effect.
Finally, combining condition (7) with the equilibrium bonus βti, Corollary 2 below compares
agents’ efforts in the full transparency regime to the equilibrium effort in the benchmark model.
Corollary 2 If there are positive effort spillovers, δ ≥ 0, then ati ≥ a
∗
i . By contrast, if there are
negative spillovers, δ < 0, then ati ≥ a
∗
i if, and only if, σ
2
j is large enough.
The economic intuition behind these results is the same as that offered for Corollary 1.
5.3 Partial (one-sided) communication
Finally, consider the subgame in which only one principal (P1, say) chooses to be transparent.
Principal P2 has a competitive advantage: he can use the additional information provided by P1
to control A2’s effort, whereas P1 can only condition A1’s wage on his own performance. Let
αt,n1 + β
t,n
1 y1 be P1’s wage offer and α
n,t
2 + β
n,t
2 y2 + γ
n,t
2 y1 be P2’s wage offer in equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 When only P1 is transparent β
t,n
1 = β
n
1 , β
n,t
2 = β
t
2 and γ
n,t
2 = γ
t
2. Agent Ai’s effort
decreases with σ2i . Moreover, it increases with σ
2
j if, and only if, δ < 0.
If only one principal commits to be transparent, the equilibrium contracts are the same as
those in Propositions 1 and 2 above. However, the principal that receives information copes more
effectively with the moral hazard problem he has with his own agent, as compared to the other
principal who draws inference about his agent’s effort based on his own performance only.
Finally, using the equilibrium condition (7), it can be easily shown that
at,n1 ≡
βn1 + δβ
t
2
1− δ2
=
1 + δ + rδσ21 + rσ
2
2(1− ρ
2)(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ21
)
(1 + rσ22 (1− ρ
2))
,
an,t2 ≡
βt2 + δβ
n
1
1− δ2
=
1 + δ + rσ21 + rσ
2
2δ(1− ρ
2)(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ21
)
(1 + rσ22 (1− ρ
2))
,
implying that
at,ni − a
t
i =
1
1− δ2
[
βni − β
t
i
]
≤ 0,
and
an,ti − a
n
i =
1
1− δ2
[
βti − β
n
i
]
≥ 0.
Hence, agent Ai’s effort is higher when principal Pj commits to be transparent, regardless of
principal Pi’s disclosure decision.
6 Communication at equilibrium
Solving the model backward, in this section we characterize the equilibrium of the whole game. We
first study how the transparency choice of one principal affects his agent’s effort, holding fixed the
transparency choice of the other principal. The insights offered by this simple exercise are useful
to understand the forces that drive the equilibrium outcome of the game.
Proposition 4 Effort choices satisfy the following properties:
(i) ati ≥ a
n,t
i for every i = 1, 2 if, and only if, δ ≥ 0;
(ii) ani ≥ a
t,n
i for every i = 1, 2 if, and only if, δ ≤ 0.
Holding fixed Pj ’s (first-stage) behavior, Pi’s decision to be transparent increases Ai’s effort if
and only if agents exert positive externalities one on the other (δ ≥ 0). In fact, the information
that Pi discloses to Pj is used to increase Aj ’s effort, which in turn boosts Ai’s effort due to
complementarity. The opposite is true when efforts are strategic substitutes (δ ≤ 0).
Building on this result, we can now characterize the equilibrium of the game. Principals’
expected profits when they choose to disclose information (t) or not (n) are illustrated in Figure 1.
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P1
P2
t n
t pit1, pi
t
2 pi
t,n
1 , pi
n,t
2
n pin,t1 , pi
t,n
2 pi
n
1 , pi
n
2
Figure 1: Communication Game.
Observe first that transparency does not affect principals’ expected profits when there are no
effort externalities (δ = 0) or when divisions’ performances are uncorrelated (ρ = 0). If there is no
strategic interaction between the agents, communication only allows principals to enforce welfare
enhancing relative performance evaluations. Hence, it is easy to verify that principals coordinate
on the equilibrium with full transparency, which clearly maximizes their joint profits. Similarly, if
division performances are uncorrelated, disclosing information about own performance to the other
division has no impact on the effort choice of that division’s agent. Hence, for ρ = 0 principals are
indifferent between being transparent or not. By contrast, when δ and ρ are different from zero
strategic considerations shape the divisions’ equilibrium behavior. We now discuss them and find
the conditions under which communication occurs at equilibrium.
Consider first an outcome in which both principals choose to be transparent. This is an equi-
librium if, and only if, the following holds
piti ≥ pi
n,t
i ∀i = 1, 2.
Using the objective function (9), the above condition can be split in two parts
piti − pi
n,t
i ≡ a
t
i − ψ(a
t
i, a
t
j)−
[
an,ti − ψ(a
n,t
i , a
t
j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic Effect
+δan,ti
[
atj − a
t,n
j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed-fee Effect
≥ 0. (15)
First, principal Pi’s decision to be transparent has an indirect effect on agent Ai’s effort: the
information disclosed to Pj is used to increase Aj ’s effort, which indirectly affects Ai’s effort. De
facto, the disclosure of a division’s performance can be interpreted as a commitment device to rise
the rival’s effort. This gives rise to a strategic effect that is captured by the first term in equation
(15). Specifically, the difference in the first term measures Pi’s gain from disclosing information
holding Aj ’s effort equal to its (candidate) equilibrium level a
t
j . Moreover, when Pi commits to
be transparent he is also directly affecting Ai’s expected utility. This is because the information
he discloses impacts on Aj ’s effort, which in turn determines Ai’s effort cost. Hence, holding Ai’s
effort equal to its deviation level an,ti , any change in aj induced by Pi’s first-stage decision modifies
the fixed component of Ai’s wage, which impacts on division i’s expected profit.
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Next, consider an outcome of the game in which both principals refrain from being transparent.
This is an equilibrium if, and only if, the following holds
pini ≥ pi
t,n
i ∀i = 1, 2.
Using the objective function stated in equation (9) the above condition can be rewritten as
pini − pi
t,n
i ≡ a
n
i − ψ(a
n
i , a
n
j )−
[
at,ni − ψ(a
t,n
i , a
n
j )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic Effect
− δat,ni
[
an,tj − a
n
j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed-fee Effect
≥ 0. (16)
Again, principal Pi’s incentive not to disclose information can be split into two components,
reflecting the role of the strategic and the fixed-fee effects discussed above. First, when principal Pi
refuses to be transparent, he gives up the possibility of influencing agent Aj ’s effort choice through
Pj ’s contract. Thus, depending on whether efforts are strategic complements or substitutes, by
refusing to communicate Pi decreases or increases Ai’s performance. Second, holding fixed Ai’s
effort, when principal Pi decides not to disclose information he shifts agent Aj ’s effort downward,
which has an impact on Ai’s effort cost thereby affecting the fixed component of the wage that Pi
must pay to Ai.
It turns out that the direction of the effects just described and the signs of (15) and (16) uniquely
depend on the sign of δ.
Proposition 5 For any admissible value of δ, the equilibrium exists and is unique. It features full
communication if δ ≥ 0, and no communication if δ < 0.
To understand the result, consider first a fully transparent equilibrium — i.e., equation (15).
The proposition shows that both effects discussed above are positive when efforts are strategic
complements. In fact, Pi’s decision to share information increases Aj ’s equilibrium effort, which,
because δ > 0, leads Ai to choose a higher effort, and, at the same time, allows Pi to reduce
the fixed component of Ai’s wage. Thus, when efforts are strategic complements, principals will
communicate at equilibrium.
What happens if efforts are strategic substitutes? Note that, even in this case, Pi’s deci-
sion to disclose information spurs Aj ’s effort because performances are correlated and the risk-
diversification effect discussed above allows Pj to lower agency costs and increase his agent’s effort.
This means that the sign of the fixed-fee effect is negative when δ < 0, because atj > a
t,n
j from
Proposition 4. Instead, the sign of the strategic effect is ambiguous: even if the choice of not
disclosing information allows Pi to increase Ai’s effort — i.e., a
t
i < a
n,t
i for δ < 0 — this does not
increase Pi’s profits. In fact, when efforts are strategic substitutes and Aj exerts high effort, it is
in Pi’s best interest to keep Ai’s effort low and take advantage of the performances’ correlation.
Indeed, Proposition 5 establishes that the negative effects of transparency prevail on the positive
ones for both principals when efforts are substitutes, thereby excluding the full transparency regime
from the possible equilibrium outcomes when δ < 0.
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Consider now an equilibrium without communication — i.e., equation (16). If efforts are strate-
gic substitutes, the strategic effect and the fixed-fee effect are both positive. By disclosing informa-
tion principal Pi indirectly spurs Aj ’s effort, which increases Ai’s (marginal) cost of effort because
δ < 0. This reduces Ai’s effort, meaning that the strategic effect is positive. At the same time,
it increases the fixed component of the wage paid to Ai, implying that also the fixed-fee effect is
positive. As a consequence, if efforts are substitutes equation (16) holds true and principals do not
communicate at equilibrium.
What happens when efforts are strategic complements? Again, although the sign of the fixed-
fee effect is negative,9 that of the strategic effect is ambiguous. In fact, when efforts are strategic
complements, other things being equal, principal Pi would like to disclose information in order to
increase agent Ai’s effort and exploit complementarity. Proposition 5 establishes that the net effect
is negative for both principals, so that no communication is not an equilibrium when efforts are
complements (δ > 0).
Finally, it is clear from the above discussion that asymmetric equilibria with unilateral infor-
mation sharing cannot exist.
7 Concluding remarks
The analysis developed in this paper has offered novel insights about: the determinants of divisions’
incentives to share information about their performances; the link between the power of incentives,
efforts and cross-division externalities; the impact of monitoring and contractual power on their
internal structure. The results have been derived under a few simplifying assumptions that are
worth discussing. First, we assumed that contracts are linear. It is well known that discontinuous
contracts (wages) might perform better. Given the hypothesis of secret contracts, we believe that
this property is likely to remain valid also in our framework. Second, we have assumed that
principals commit to disclose information at the outset of the game. More generally, it would be
interesting to know how these incentives change if principals lack this commitment power. Our
conjecture is that, without commitment, each principal may strategically select the states of nature
to be disclosed ex-post, so as to influence the effort of the other agent to his own advantage. Third,
in our model agents are ex-ante identical and divisions do not compete to attract them. Clearly,
when divisions compete to attract efficient types, information disclosure about past performances
may act as a signal device that makes rivals aware of own agents’ productivity. Hence, divisions with
lower cash flows may be unable to retain efficient agents; this may create an assortative matching
that could be worth investigating. Finally, a somewhat natural extension of the model worth
exploring is its infinitely repeated version in which contract and information sharing decisions may
allow principals to achieve more cooperative outcomes. One question that could be analyzed in that
extended framework is whether information disclosure about agents’ performances is substitute or
complement to information disclosure about contracts. We leave these questions to future research.
9That is, the sign of this effect is the opposite of the one we obtain with strategic complementarities, because
a
n,t
j > a
n
j when δ > 0.
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Appendix
Preliminaries. Before proving the results stated in the main body of the paper, we detail the
conditions that guarantee that equilibrium efforts, the cost and the marginal cost of effort are
positive in every admissible outcome of the game. These conditions define the region of parameters
to which we restrict the analysis.
Using the expressions for the equilibrium efforts, it can be easily verified that they are positive
as long as the following assumption holds
A1: 1 + δ + r(σ2j
(
1− ρ2
)
+ δσ2i ) > 0 ∀i, j = 1, 2,
which implies that an agent whose principal adopts a regime with transparency, but does not receive
information, exerts positive effort.
Moreover, the effort cost, ψi (ai, aj), is positive if, and only if, 2δ <
ai
aj
, while the marginal cost
is positive if, and only if, δ < ai
aj
, which is implied by the former condition. Using the expression
for the equilibrium efforts, a sufficient condition for the effort cost to be (strictly) positive is
A2: 2δ <
1 + δ + r(δσ2i + (1− ρ
2)σ2j )
1 + δ + r(σ2i + δ(1− ρ
2)σ2j )
∀i, j = 1, 2,
which implies that an agent whose principal does not disclose but receives information incurs in
effort costs. More generally, A2 guarantees that the cost of effort is always positive in equilibrium,
even when there are positive externalities between the agent’s choices so that the net cost of effort
is attenuated. Note that, given assumption A1, condition A2 is compelling only if δ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result obtains by combining the agents’ first-order conditions
(6). The comparative statics is immediate. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that principals do not communicate. The first-order conditions
in (10) rewrite as
1− δ2 =
(
1− δ2
)
rσ2i βi + [βi + δβ
n
j − δ(β
n
j + δβi)] ∀i, j = 1, 2,
whose solution yields
βni =
1
1 + rσ2i
,
which implies that βns = β
∗
i . Substituting β
n
i and β
n
j into ai
(
βi, βj
)
, we obtain that
ani =
1 + rσ2j + δ(1 + rσ
2
i )(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ2i
)
(1 + rσ2j )
.
Differentiating with respect to σ2i and σ
2
j , we have that
∂ani
∂σ2i
= −
r
(1− δ2)(1 + rσ2i )
2
< 0,
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and
∂ani
∂σ2j
= −
rδ
(1− δ2)(1 + rσ2i )
2
≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≤ 0.
Direct comparison between ani and a
n
j yields
ani − a
n
j =
(σi + σj) (σj − σi) r
(1 + δ)
(
1 + rσ2i
)
(1 + rσ2j )
≥ 0 ⇔ σi ≤ σj .
Finally, it can be easily verified that, under assumptions A1 and A2, ani > 0 and a
n
i − δa
n
j > 0 for
each i, j = 1, 2, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The result that ani ≥ a
∗
i when δ ≥ 0 follows from the definition of the
function ai(β
n
i , β
n
j ) and the fact that β
n
i = β
∗
i . Consider thus the case with δ < 0. Then
ani ≥ a
∗
i ⇔ a
n
i =
1 + rσ2j + δ(1 + rσ
2
i )(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ2i
)
(1 + rσ2j )
≥
1
1 + rσ2i
.
First, recall that
∂ani
∂σ2j
> 0 for δ < 0 by Proposition 1. Second, observe that
lim
σj→+∞
(ani − a
∗
i ) =
δ2(
1− δ2
)
(1 + rσ2i )
> 0,
lim
σj→0
(ani − a
∗
i ) =
δ
(
1 + δ + rσ2i
)(
1− δ2
) (
1 + rσ2i
) < 0.
Hence, by the mean-value theorem there exists a threshold σ∗j > 0 such that a
n
i ≥ a
∗
i if σj ≥ σ
∗
j . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that both principals choose to be transparent. The first-order
conditions in (10)-(11) rewrite as
1− δ2 =
(
1− δ2
)
r(σ2i βi + γiσiσjρ) + [βi + δβ
t
j − δ(β
t
j + δβi)] ∀i, j = 1, 2,
0 = σ2jγi + βiσiσjρ ∀i, j = 1, 2,
whose solution yields
βti =
1
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
,
γti = −
σi
σj
ρ
1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2)
.
Hence, βti ≥ β
n
i = β
∗
i for all ρ ∈ (−1, 1). Moreover, γ
t
i ≥ 0 if, and only if, ρ ≤ 0. Substituting β
t
i
and βtj into ai(βi, βj), we then obtain
ati =
1 + δ + r(1− ρ2)(σ2j + δσ
2
i )(
1− δ2
)
(1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2))(1 + rσ2j (1− ρ
2))
.
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Differentiating with respect to σ2i and σ
2
j , we find that
∂ati
∂σ2i
= −
(
1− ρ2
)
r
(1− δ2)(1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2))2
< 0,
∂ati
∂σ2j
= −
(
1− ρ2
)
rδ
(1− δ2)(1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2))2
≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≤ 0.
Direct comparison of ati and a
t
j yields
ati − a
t
j =
(
1− ρ2
)
(σi + σj) (σj − σi) r
(1 + δ)(1 + rσ2i (1− ρ
2))(1 + rσ2j (1− ρ
2))
≥ 0 ⇔ σi ≤ σj .
Finally, it can be easily verified that under assumptions A1 and A2 ati > 0 and a
t
i − δa
t
j > 0 for
each (i, j) = 1, 2, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof of this result follows the same logic as that offered to prove
Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of this result follows the same logic as in the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that
ati − a
n,t
i ≡
1
1− δ2
[βti + δβ
t
j − (β
t
i + δβ
n
j )]
=
δ
1− δ2
[βtj − β
n
i ] ≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≥ 0.
Similarly,
ani − a
t,n
i ≡
1
1− δ2
[βni + δβ
n
j − (β
n
i + δβ
t
j)]
=
δ
1− δ2
[βnj − β
t
j ] ≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≤ 0.
Hence, the result. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We want to prove that the equilibrium is unique and that it features
full transparency when δ > 0 and no communication when δ < 0.
Consider first the incentive to stick to an equilibrium with fully transparency. This is given by
the sign of piti − pi
n,t
i . We want to prove that pi
t
i − pi
n,t
i < 0 for at least one principal when δ < 0,
while piti − pi
n,t
i > 0 for both principals when δ > 0. We can rewrite (15) as
piti − pi
n,t
i = a
t
i −
(ati)
2
2
+ δatia
t
j −
[
an,ti −
(an,ti )
2
2
+ δan,ti a
t,n
j
]
,
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which, substituting the efforts as functions of the contracts — i.e., equation (7) — and simplifying,
becomes
piti − pi
n,t
i = [β
t
j − β
n
j ]δ
2 + δ(βnj + β
t
j − 2δ
(
1− βti
)
)
2
(
1− δ2
)2 . (A1)
Notice first that (A1) equals 0 when δ = 0, while its sign depends, for given δ, on the sign of the
numerator — in fact, βtj > β
n
j by Proposition 2. Define the numerator of (A1) as
ξi (δ) ≡ 2 + δ(β
n
j + β
t
j − 2δ
(
1− βti
)
).
Consider first δ < 0. Then, we need ξ (δ) > 0 for at least one i = 1, 2. Because βti < 1 by
Proposition 2, it is clear that
∂ξi (δ)
∂δ
= βnj + β
t
j − 4δ
(
1− βti
)
> 0 ∀δ ∈ (−1, 0) .
Hence, in the range considered, ξi (δ) is minimized at δ → −1, taking value ξi (−1) = 2β
t
i−β
t
j−β
n
i .
Let’s now assume that σj > σi. Then, by Proposition 2, β
t
i > β
t
j , implying that ξ (−1) > 0 and,
a fortiori, ξi (δ) > 0 for all δ < 0. This implies that (A1) is negative so that principal Pi deviates
from the equilibrium with full transparency. If σj < σi, then the argument applies unchanged to
principal Pj who breaks the equilibrium. This proves that there exists no equilibrium with full
transparency when δ < 0.
Consider now δ > 0. Then, we want to show that ξi (δ) > 0 for all δ > 0 for both principals.
Now, ξi (δ) is clearly concave and such that ξ
′
i (0) = β
n
j + β
t
j > 0. Hence, the minimum value of
ξi (δ) over the range [0, 1] is either at δ = 0 or, if the function has a maximum for some δ
max ∈ (0, 1),
at δ = 1. Because ξi (0) = 2 and ξi (1) = β
n
j + β
t
j + 2β
t
i > 0, we conclude that ξi (δ) > 0 for all
δ > 0. Hence, (A1) is positive for both principals and full transparency is indeed an equilibrium.
Next, consider the incentive to stick to an equilibrium with no communication. We want to
prove that pini −pi
t,n
i < 0 for at least one principal when δ > 0, while pi
n
i −pi
t,n
i > 0 for both principals
when δ < 0. We can rewrite the profit difference as
pini − pi
t,n
i = a
n
i −
(ani )
2
2
+ δani a
n
j −
[
at,ni −
(at,ni )
2
2
+ δat,ni a
n,t
j
]
,
which, using (7) and simplifying, becomes
pini − pi
t,n
i = −[β
t
j − β
n
j ]δ
2 + δ(βnj + β
t
j − 2δ (1− β
n
i ))
2
(
1− δ2
)2 . (A2)
Again, (A2) equals 0 when δ = 0, while its sign depends, for given δ, on the sign of the numerator.
Define the numerator as
χi (δ) ≡ 2 + δ(β
n
j + β
t
j − 2δ (1− β
n
i )).
Consider first δ > 0. By the same logic used above, it is easy to show that χi (δ) is a concave
function increasing at δ = 0 and such that it has a minimum either at δ = 0 or at δ = 1. Because
χi (0) = 2 > 0 and χi (1) = β
n
j + β
t
j + 2β
n
i > 0, it is clear that, when δ > 0, it holds pi
n
i − pi
t,n
i < 0
for both principals. Together with the arguments made above, this implies that, whenever δ > 0,
the unique equilibrium features full transparency.
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Consider now δ < 0. We want to show that pini − pi
t,n
i > 0 for both principals. The profit
differential can be rewritten as in equation (16)
pini − pi
t,n
i = a
n
i − ψ(a
n
i , a
n
j )− [a
t,n
i − ψ(a
t,n
i , a
n
j )]− δa
t,n
i [a
n,t
j − a
n
j ].
We know from Section 5.3 that an,tj > a
n
j so that the last term above is clearly positive. We still
have to show that the sum of the remaining addenda is also positive. We can rewrite it as
pini − pi
t,n
i + δa
t,n
i [a
n,t
j − a
n
j ] = a
n
i
[
1−
ani
2
+ δanj
]
− at,ni
[
1−
at,ni
2
+ δanj
]
,
which, using (7), becomes
pini − pi
t,n
i + δa
t,n
i [a
n,t
j − a
n
j ] = −(β
t
j − β
n
j )δ
2
(
1− δ2
)
(1− βni )− δ(β
t
j − β
n
j )
2
(
1− δ2
)2 . (A3)
The sign of (A3) depends, for given δ, on the sign of the numerator. Which is positive when δ < 0
for i = 1, 2, as βni < 1 and β
t
j ≥ β
n
j . Hence, pi
n
i −pi
t,n
i > 0 for both principals whenever δ < 0. This,
coupled with the arguments above establishes uniqueness of the no communication equilibrium
when δ < 0. 
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